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ST. ANTHONY'S DAY.

FROM MY ROMAN JOURNAL.

BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.

III.

On St. Anthony's Day (Jan. 17) the animals were blest. The ceremony occurs at the vestibule of the church of St. Anastasia. This church is near the splendid ruins of the Forum, and the arch of Janus; it is near fifteen centuries old, but the ever-restoring hand has kept this homely church new, in appearance, while the Palace of the Cæsars, whose cellar adjoins its crypt, and the exquisitely carved monuments of another faith, have crumbled around it. So little does any superstition care to preserve any beauty that cannot be turned into a buttress for itself. Inside the church is a marble figure of the fair martyr Anastasia, reclining on a fagot; before her altar St. Jerome once celebrated mass. I was more interested in a life-sized bust of St. Anthony, (the "Abbot") with a lamp burning before it—the little flame hardly visible in the bright daylight. This bust, apparently of tinted porcelain, gives the Saint long dark hair, dark eyes, and a benevolent face. The golden complexion of the Saint bore to my eye—possibly to my fancy—a suggestive resemblance to the Buddhas in Ceylon. Buddha and St. Anthony have the honor of being the only prophets known to religious history as having shown any consideration for animals. Save for the prudential maxim about not muzzling the ox that treads out the grain, there is nothing in the Bible that can be construed into a tenderness for animals; what Christ said of a "providence in the fall of a sparrow," being by no means promising for the sparrow's life. According to the Buddhists, their Lord believed the animals to contain human spirits on their way to human forms. So I cannot help suspecting that this little lamp before the golden-hued Anthony was lit at the shrine of golden-hued Buddha. But its paleness in to-day's sunshine has also a suggestiveness. Europe utterly lost the oriental faith of relationship between man and the animals, until it was restored by Darwin. It may even be that Buddha was a forerunner of Darwin, and that it was a theory of evolution which Buddhist theologians turned into a theory of transmigration. However that may be, Darwin is the real founder of every existing society for the prevention of cruelty to animals. I cannot learn, after some inquiry, that a single society of that kind existed either in Europe or America before the publication of Darwin's "Origin of Species." I imagine that the Pope recognized Darwinism in this movement when some ladies in Rome—chiefly English—asked him to become the chief patron of such a society. He promptly declined, and I have heard that he added, "Man owes no duty to the animals, and it is a heresy to suppose that he does." I cannot vouch for this, nor that it was the present pope who refused,—for he looks like a kindly old man. However, the society has never had any sympathy from the vatican. It has gained a success in doing away with the barbed races at Carnival. I have seen those horses dashing with agonized fury under the barbs—their only riders—which pierced their backs at every leap. The scene now belongs to the gladiatorial Past of Rome.

During the long pre-Darwinite ages of Europe this one little light burning before the Saint who preached to the birds and fishes—the only congregation near his hermitage—was the only witness to any survival in the West, of the sympathy which led the Buddhist emperor Asôka to build hospitals for animals,—centuries before the Christian era. It is said of the fishes who listened to St. Anthony,

> "Much delighted were they
> But preferred the old way."

I fear it is much the same with those who take their animals to be blest on the Saint's day. Judging by the fate of some overloaded horses which I saw on my way to the church—one poor beast on his knees being lashed to his feet—I fear that "the old way" will continue for some time, or until Anthony surrenders to Darwin. For in the ceremonies and prayers at St. Anastasia, there was nothing to suggest that the welfare of the animals depended at all on kind treatment from their owners; it was all to be on the Saint's intercession. The sentiment was directed to Anthony, who, had he been present, would no doubt have said, "Why call me Saint! Saint! and do not the things that I said concerning my 'little brothers,' your domestic animals?" The behavior of some of the animals brought up for benediction—a frightened horse kicking, the dogs licking off their holy water—caused a Catholic

near me to say, "See! they are possessed; they need exorcism!" But instead of discerning the presence of inner demons hating holy-water, I saw in these nervous terrors a testimony of the dumb creatures to long experience of unfriendliness. They could not imagine that they were brought up with their noses in a church door, or that a brass aspersoir could be dashed towards them, except for some evil purpose on the part of man. The lap-dogs, used to petting, were serene enough under the process.

In the doorway of the church stood a small black-eyed priest, with sharp features, holding the brass aspersoir—a handle seven inches long with a perforated globe at top, about three inches diameter. At his side stood a large priest, with ample lace on his dress, whose good-natured face was somewhat like that of a dray-horse he was blessing when I arrived. He read from a card-board some prayers in Latin. The first, which I managed to translate exactly was as follows: "May these animals receive thy benediction, O Lord, and be saved in their flesh, and delivered from every evil, through the intercession of the Blessed Saint Anthony, through Christ our Lord, Amen." The next was very nearly this: "Omnipotent and eternal God, who didst cause the glorious Blessed Anthony, proved by various temptations among the tempters of this world, to depart unharmed, grant to thy servants that they may be enabled to follow his excellent example, through Christ our Lord, Amen." The third and last was a brief benediction on the animals, during and after which the smaller priest sprinkled the animals, which were all surprised, and some insulted. To each comer was given a small picture of the Saint in his rock-hermitage with rude crucifix, rosary, and book. No money was in any case accepted for the benediction; I saw repeated refusals of pay-

The priests stood at this work from 10 A. M. to 4 P. M., going through the prayers in a monotonous automatic way, neither of the holy men seeming to glance even at any animal brought before them,—though, as it occurs but once a year, one might expect them to take some interest in it. In front of the church a busy trade was carried on by boys and old women in holy and highly colored pictures, among which I found a rather interesting one. It represents St. Anthony in Friar's garb, with a rayed star near his cowl on which is written "Charitas." He is surrounded by medallions representing his miracles: a huge church bell, offered him in derision if he will carry it away, rises at his touch to follow him; he puts his hand in flame, without harm; he raises from death three children; he resuscitates a man frozen eleven days in the snow; with an herb he restores sight to a blind woman; he sails from Faro to Messina on his mantle with another friar; he rescues a lamb alive from a burning lime-kiln; he rebukes Ferdinand, king of Naples, for his misgovernment, making blood flow from some article, which seems to be the king's watch. Poor old Anthony little dreamed of the fairy-tales that would surround him in the far future!

All this took place near the Forum, where Cicero's voice was heard; on a street where Livy, and Tacitus, and Juvenal, and Horace, have many a time walked. Around are monuments of the civilization which high-born Anastasia renounced, at cost of palatial luxuries, parental love, finally her life, for the sake of her vision of the heavenly kingdom about to come on earth. The Rome she renounced was not quite civilized, indeed, but what would Anastasia say of her visionary Christian Rome, if she saw its fruits this day? It was a terrible instruction in the laws of human reversion,—or even atrophy,—to observe these people at the church-door, themselves stunted beside their finely-bred cattle and hunting-dogs. I am daily impressed by the miserable appearance of these Roman masses. Last week the great military funeral of the king's favorite general (Pasi) brought an immense crowd into the streets. I found myself jammed among hundreds of thousands. Unable to retreat I passed a half hour observing the crowd, and could not discover one comely female face among them. Their eyes were bleared, their features malformed, their complexions like tallow, their voices husky. In Italian homes I have seen several pretty domestics, and the "ladies" are as handsome as elsewhere; but among these toiling and moiling ones, ugliness is normal. The men are better-looking, but are undersized; even the soldiers, set to keep order in the vast crowd, were like boys; the throng broke through their cordon here and there, and then cracked jokes with them. The struggle for existence is too hard in Rome. And it is a sorry reflection that one could not break up these temples, nor disperse these superstitions, without destroying the subsistence of thousands. Superstitions now propagate themselves less by their religious value than by their economic necessity to these miserable masses.

After all, it is to be feared that whatever good Anthony may have done for animals, is more than undone by the evil his thorn-worship has done humanity. It is said that St. Benedict, at a later epoch, went on a pilgrimage to the thicket where St. Anthony rolled himself in thorns, and, clearing away the thorns, planted in their stead a garden of roses. But the roses were nurtured too late to ever bloom on Italian cheeks. Ages of Asceticism had eaten too far in the vital principle of this people. If there is anything rosy in their faces, it is more likely to be "St. Anthony's Fire,"—as we used to call erysipelas,—or other eruptions for which the Saint was once invoked,

I believe, as a master of fire and flame-like troubles.

However much the freethinking spirit protests, the humanitarian spirit in one cannot repress a compassionate satisfaction that the miserable so often dwell in a realm of pious Faerie; that each, in the proportion that he or she is mentally dwarfed, is certain of putting forth shining wings at last, and dwelling for ever in palaces but faintly fabled in these ancient splendors of Rome.

FIRE-WORSHIP AND MYTHOLOGY IN THEIR RELATION TO RELIGION.*

BY PROFESSOR F. MAX MÜLLER.

THE nearest relations of the ancient Aryas of India were no doubt the Aryas of Media and Persia, of whose religion we obtain some interesting though fragmentary information from the Zend-Avesta. The idea, once so prevalent, that their religion consisted entirely of Fire-Worship has long been surrendered by scholars, though it crops out again and again in popular writings. From the first acquaintance with the original texts of their sacred writings it became clear that fire occupied only a subordinate place in their religious system. If we call the religion of Zoroaster fire-worship, we must apply the same name to the religion of India, nay, even to the religion of the Jews. Almost every religion which recognizes burnt-offerings exhibits at the same time a more or less prominent reverence for the sacrificial fire itself, and to outsiders and casual observers in particular the fires burning on the altars of temples or on the hearth of every house seem to be the principal manifestation of religious worship and of religious faith. The real object of veneration with Zoroaster and his followers was Ahura-mazda, whom we call Ormuzd.

Ahura-mazda was a deity whose deepest roots we shall discover in the concepts of heaven, light, and wisdom. He was not Fire, though he is often represented as the father of Fire. This shows his close relationship with the Vedic Dyans, the sky, who was likewise conceived as the father of Agni. The name of fire in Zend, however, is not Agni, but *Atar*, a word which in Sanskrit exists only in the name *Athar-van*, one of the early sages who kept the fire. It is sometimes used also as a name of Agni himself. The word *atar* has no etymology, so far as we know, either in Sanskrit or Zend.

It is generally supposed that the religion of the Avesta differs from that of the Veda by being dualistic. In one sense this is perfectly true. The Zoroastrians recognize an evil spirit, Angra Mainyu, by the side of the good spirit, Ahura-mazda. In some respects these two spirits are equals. The good spirit did not create the evil spirit, nor can he altogether prevent the mischief that is wrought by the evil spirit. The Zoroastrian religion, having a decidedly moral character, recognizes in this struggle between good and evil the eternal law of reward and punishment, good always begetting good, and evil evil. In the same manner the good spirit opposes the evil spirit, and every man is expected to fight against evil in every shape.

Zoroaster himself was supposed to have been appointed by Ahura-mazda to defend the good people, it may be the agricultural population, against the attacks of their enemies, the worshippers of the Devas. The oldest prayers in the Avesta are supposed to have been addressed by Zoroaster to Ahura-mazda, imploring his help, and mourning over the suffering of his people.

All this is perfectly true; but if we once know from the Veda what the fight between good and evil, between light and darkness, meant in the beginning, we shall understand that, after all, in the Dualism of the Avesta, the good spirit is always supreme, as Indra is supreme over Vritra, Agni over Ahi, Atar over Azi Dahaka. The fact that Indra has an enemy, that light is sometimes overwhelmed by darkness, does not annihilate the belief in the supremacy of one of these two contending powers. The gods are always conceived as different in kind from their opponents. The gods are worshipped, the demons are feared. If, therefore, we call the ancient religion of Zoroaster dualistic, the same name might be applied to the Vedic religion, as far as it recognizes Vritra and other powers of darkness as dangerous opponents of the bright beings. Indeed, I doubt whether there is any religion which is dualistic in the sense of recognizing two divine antagonistic powers as perfect equals. Even races who offer sacrifices to evil spirits only, ar m to neglect the good spirits, do so because they trust the latter, but are afraid of the former. Wher ever there is a belief in a devil the devil may be very powerful, but he can never become supreme. He is by his very nature a negative, not a positive concept, just as night is conceived as a negation of day, not day as a negation of night. No doubt the powers of evil in the Avesta are different from the powers of darkness in the Veda. They have assumed a decidedly moral character. But they are the same in origin, and it is owing to this that they never have, never could have, attained to perfect equality with the good and Wise Spirit, Ahura-mazda.

The same source which supplied man with religious concepts, produced also a number of ideas which cannot claim to be called religious in any sense, least of all in that which we now connect with the name of religion. We saw how in the Veda the concept of fire had been raised higher and higher till at last it be-

* From a Report in the London *Christian World*, copies of which were kindly sent us by Prof. Max Müller.

came synonymous with the Supreme Deity of the Vedic poets. But in the monstrous birth of Hephaestos, likewise a representative, or, as we sometimes say, likewise a god of fire, in his disgraceful ejection from the sky, in his marriage with Aphrodite, to say nothing of the painful *dénouement* of that ill-judged union, there is very little of natural religion, very little of 'the perception of the infinite under such manifestations as are able to influence the moral conduct of man.' These mythological stories are chips and splinters from the same block out of which many a divine image has been chiselled by the human mind, but they ought nevertheless to be carefully distinguished from that original block.

This distinction however has not only been neglected, it seems often to have been wilfully neglected. Whenever it was necessary to criticise any of the non-Christian religions in a hostile spirit, these stories, the stories of Venus, and Vulcan, and Mars, have constantly been quoted as showing the degraded character of ancient gods and heroes, and of pagan religion in general. This is most unfair. Neither does this mythological *detritus*, not to say, rubbish, represent the essential elements of the religion of Greeks and Romans, nor did the ancients themselves believe that it did. We must remember that the ancient nations had really no word or concept as yet for religion in the comprehensive sense which we attach to it. It would hardly be possible to ask the question in any of the ancient languages, or even in classical Greek, whether a belief in Hephaestos and Aphrodite constituted an article of religion. It is true that the ancients, as we call them rather promiscuously, had but one name for their gods, whether they meant Jupiter, the *Deus Optimus Maximus*, or Jupiter, the faithless husband of Juno. But when we speak of the ancients in general, we must not forget that we are speaking, not only of Homer and Hesiod, but likewise of men like Herakleitos, Aeschylus, and Plato. These ancient thinkers knew as well as we do, that nothing unworthy of the gods could ever have been true of them, still less of the supreme God; and if they tolerated mythology and legends, those who thought at all about these matters looked upon them as belonging to quite a different sphere of human interests. If we once understand how mythology and legends arose, how they represent an inevitable stage in the growth of ancient language and thought, we shall comprehend not only their outward connection with religious ideas, but likewise their very essential difference. But while on the one hand it is quite true that the sources of religion and mythology are conterminous, nay, that certain concepts which in their origin might be called religious, wither away into mere mythology and romance, we shall see that it likewise happens, and by no means infrequently, that ideas, at first entirely unconnected with religion, assume a religious character in the course of time.

This is an important subject, but beset with many difficulties. Of course, the deification of an animal, such as an Egyptian Apis, or the apotheosis of a human being, such as Romulus or the Emperor Augustus, presupposes the previous existence in the human mind of the concept of divinity, a concept which, as we saw, required many generations for its elaboration. Again, the attribution of a divine sanction bestowed either on customs or laws presupposes a belief in something superhuman or divine. But, after a time, all this is forgotten, and these later developments of religious thought are mixed up with the more primitive elements of religion in a hopeless confusion.

In India we are able to prove by documentary evidence that the concept of Fire, embodying the concepts of Warmth, Light, and Life, was raised gradually to that of a divine and supreme being, the maker and ruler of the world. And if in the Veda we have the facts of that development clearly before us, it seems to me that we have a right to say that in other religions also where Fire occupies the same supreme position, it may have passed through the same stages through which Agni passed in the Veda. By the side of this theogonic process, however, we can likewise watch in the Veda the beginning at least of a mythological development which becomes wider and richer in the epic literature of India. This side is most prominent in Greece and Rome, where the legends told of Hephaestos contain but few grains of Agni as the creator and ruler of the world. Lastly, the ceremonial development of Fire is exhibited to us in what has sometimes been called fire-worship, but is in most cases merely a recognition of the usefulness of fire for domestic, sacrificial, and even medicinal purposes. These three sides, though they have much in common, should nevertheless be kept carefully distinct in the study of religion.

It may be said, in fact, it has been said, that the definition of religion which I laid down in my former course of lectures is too narrow and too arbitrary. In one sense, every definition may be said to be arbitrary, for it is meant to fix the limits which the definer wishes to assign to a certain concept or name. Both in including and excluding, the definer may differ from other definers, and those who differ from him will naturally call his definitions either too narrow or too wide. I thought it right, for instance, to modify my first definition of religion as 'the perception of the Infinite,' by narrowing that perception to 'such manifestations as are able to influence the moral character of man.' I do not deny that in the beginning the perception of the Infinite had often very little to do with

moral ideas, and I am quite aware that many religions enjoin what is either not moral or even immoral. But though there are perceptions of the Infinite unconnected as yet with moral ideas, I doubt whether they should be called religions till they assume a moral influence. On this point there may be difference of opinion, but every one may claim the right of his own opinion. If some religions sanctify what is immoral, or what seems to us immoral, this surely would not disprove, on the contrary, it would prove, the influence of religion on the moral conduct of man.

We are told, for instance, that the pre-historic Hebrews killed their first-born in sacrifice to their God. Abraham came very near doing the same thing. Jephtha killed his daughter, and David killed the murderers of the son of Saul, and kept them hanging in the air all summer long, to remind his God that Ishbosheth was avenged. If you catch a Yezidee in the act of stealing, he will tell you that theft is a part of his religion. If you catch a Thug in the act of assassination, he will tell you that murder is to him a religious rite. If you reprove the Todas of the Nilgheri Hills for living in polyandry, they will tell you that this is the very groundwork of their religion. If you reprove the Mormons for living in polygamy, they will remind you that this is the Biblical chart of their faith.

Now, suppose that all this were true, would it not prove the very opposite of what it is meant to prove? If religion, as based originally on the perception of something infinite and supernatural, can induce men to commit acts which they themselves, or which we, at least, consider doubtful, or objectionable, or altogether criminal, surely it shows that religion, even in this extreme case, exercises an influence on the moral character of man such as probably nothing else could exercise. From the moment, therefore, that the perception of something supernatural begins to exercise an influence on the moral nature of man, be it for good or for evil, we have a right to say that it is religious. Even mere mythology, if it should determine the moral activity of man, as it has both in ancient and modern times, has a right to be called religious. Nay, even ceremonial, unless it has become totally unmeaning, may claim to have exercised an elevating influence, and so far have a right to be called religious.

THE AIMS OF ETHNOLOGICAL RESEARCH.*

ETHNIC PSYCHOLOGY, MORALS, RELIGION, ANIMISM.

BY DR. TH. ACHELIS.

II.

In our previous article we referred to the indispensability and importance of classified collections.

*Translated from the *Deutsche Rundschau* by μκρκ.

It would carry us too far to give at this juncture a detailed explanation of the difficulties to be encountered in obtaining these indispensable requirements, and of how cautiously the comparative psychological method must proceed when dealing, as it must often do, with primitive races that possess no literary traditions. Yet one point demands a brief consideration; for an unfounded aspersion upon Ethnology is frequently associated with it. It is our indifference to chronological order. As before stated, it is to be regarded as a fact based upon a mass of indisputable and unassailable material, that the beginnings of the social life of mankind on earth everywhere exhibit unusual resemblances, and that this similarity of psychical structure is not restricted by topographical and historical barriers. Now, as Ethnology is only concerned with an exact exposition—that is, one established by induction—of the development of the general and universally observable forms of social organization mentioned, it is manifest that a chronological perspective of an isolated epoch in history would have no significance whatever so far as this object is concerned. If we can determine with approximate certainty that the clan, or peace-confederacy, founded on blood-relationship, is the germinal cell of all later differentiations of civilization, it is totally immaterial whether in our process of proof we refer to peoples at present existing in a state of nature, or whether we refer to the prehistoric stages of nations long since extinct. Like causes and like conditions, in their organic connection, are alone the determining factors here; but at what time, that is, in what century according to our chronology, they have operated to produce observed results is to the universal perspective of Ethnology a matter of entire indifference. Historical doctrinarianism alone can close its eyes to this truth, and withhold its recognition of these words of Bastian's: "Ethnology inspects by comparison the elemental psychic processes of human life, and seeks genetically in each of these elemental processes for fundamental germinal principles. Concrete history, on the other hand, has for its object the solution and explication, in every instance, of the intricate problems that result from the action of geographical natural influences upon peoples in a state of nature, as well as from the immaterial spiritual factors in the cross-currents of a matured civilization."

Coming now to the task we have set ourselves of marking out the purpose and mission of modern Ethnology, it will appear from our former remarks that absolute completeness is not aimed at. An endeavor will only be made to emphasize the leading principles and the most important achievements of the new science. Although the master-spirit and founder of Ethnology, A. Bastian, will be in the main our guide, we

shall be obliged to supplement our exposition by reference also to the work of other celebrated investigators.

To Oscar Peschel, the renowned geographer, is the honor chiefly due of having elucidated the fundamental view-point of this science, and of having first introduced this new conception of the world into remoter circles. Indeed it was a matter of primary importance to establish a firm and definite basis of criticism as a bulwark against the humors of Æstheticism. Many writers in dealing with savage peoples have felt obliged to assume a slow moral decline from an original Paradisian state of purity, while others have seen in savages the impersonation of idyllic gentleness and simplicity as yet untouched by the vices of civilization. As a classic demonstration of this sentimental rhapsodizing our author quotes this saying of a traveler: "What! They, the dreaded savages! They are timid children of nature, happy, if no evil befalls them?" And he relates that the day after the remark they slew the traveler.

Similarly one-sided and untenable is the theory, still often maintained, of a state of utter animal obtuseness and barbarity. All accounts agree as to the non-existence of any such primitive tribe as is lacking in the scantiest vestiges of human intelligence and civilization. We must ever bear in mind, though, that we are not to exact too much from this fact. Religion, law, art, and the like, are intelligible in their later differentiation only, as the products of a highly advanced civilization. But in their invisible beginnings they exist in every organized type of our race; for it stands to reason that evolution can create nothing new, but can only develop latent germs.

The fact of the rapid extinction of aboriginal tribes when brought into contact with higher forms of civilization, is, as Peschel thinks, frequently misinterpreted. He says: "Murderous oppression is, above all, not the cause. The Spaniards are often enough taken to task for excessive cruelty. We will not deny that they have freely stained their hands with Indian blood; but it was done from cupidity alone, and not from blood-thirstiness. Extermination was always denounced; it was forbidden by laws, although their enforcement was ineffective. The transatlantic history of Spain knows no instance to compare with the criminal depravity of the Portuguese in Brazil, who scattered the clothing of scarlet-fever and small-pox patients about the plains, that these diseases might be thus artificially spread among the natives; or with that where the springs in the deserts of Utah, from which the Indians were wont to drink, were poisoned with strychnine; or with that where the wives of Australian settlers mixed arsenic with the food they gave the famine-stricken natives; or with that where the English settlers of Tasmania shot down the native inhabitants of the country, when they had no better food for their dogs. Yet neither cruelty nor oppression has as yet fully exterminated a race of men. No new disease, not even small-pox, has extirpated a nation, much less the plague of intemperance. A still stranger angel of death hovers above these once happy and joyous races of men—the *tædium vitæ*, or weariness of life."

This cause of extinction, based upon various observations, the author derives from the diametrical contrariety of mental organization developed in races of lower and higher stages of civilization; the discomfort of transition from the state in which they have hitherto vegetated, to a state which is farther advanced and more fraught with toil and exertion; the extraordinarily slight regard for life so characteristic of the aboriginal tribes among which this extinction occurs.

Whatever solution this question may meet with (for physical and particularly structural factors are also to be taken into account), yet in another direction, bearing upon the clarification of our notions of morality, Peschel has undoubtedly established the correct criterion. It well characterizes the narrow basis upon which our conception of the world has arisen, that we are inclined to regard our own ethical ideal as absolutely the highest, and to exalt it to an *a priori* dignity. A trifling, and yet in the use that is made of it, a significant, instance of this dangerous and hasty way of generalization is offered by the sense of shame, which a wide-spread error is wont to associate with the most complete practical covering of the body possible, in accordance with the European idea. "The more familiar we have become with foreign customs through extensive inquiry, the more firmly has it become established that nudity and modesty are not incompatible, and further, that the sense of shame in different nations demands that at one time one part, and that at another time another part, of the body shall be covered. If a pious Moslem from Ferghana were to attend our balls and behold the denudations of our wives and daughters, and the half-embraces of our so-called round dances, he would marvel in secret at the forbearing patience of Allah, that he had not long ago let loose the sulphurous fires of heaven, upon our sinful and shameless race. However, before the appearance of the Prophet the veiling of women was not customary in the East. The Countess Pauline Nostiz caused deep embarrassment among the high ladies of the royal harem of Maskat for approaching them without a mask of gauze. Not even does a mother see the uncovered face of her child after its twelfth year, whereas transparent robes make body and limbs plainly visible." On the other hand, there are peoples who (compelled by the climate) cover their bodies com-

p'etely, and yet indulge in the most wanton of moral excesses.

However, although the nude human body was the province in which the nascent sense of beauty first exercised itself, so that persons not tattooed even now excite in savages a feeling of deep contempt; yet, notwithstanding this fact, clothing has very considerably promoted our original æsthetic ideas. "The want of clothing first arose with the consciousness of a more exalted dignity. It proclaims to us an endeavor firmly to mark the line of separation between man and beast. It is not the mere vanity of advanced age, which would seek to withdraw from view the loss of youthful charms, but the desire awakened in early youth, to throw a veil upon all unmerited degradation imposed upon us by the care of our animal bodies, and to appear before others as pure and as fair as the lily in the language of the Gospel."

If Ethnology is to furnish a collective picture of the mental life of mankind, it will be first necessary to trace among the different nations of the earth the origin and growth of this psychical world in its organic continuity as presented in the history of religion. And it is comparative psychology as expounded by Bastian and Tylor that is appointed to introduce lucidity and order into this chaos of apparently inexplicable incongruencies and ridiculous travesties, and thereby to render possible an inductive explication of our supersensual ideas. In this instance also, it is evident that the social view-point is the one that is alone productive of results. Only in joint and unceasing interaction, separated but by a mobile line from superstition, are the great systems of Belief fashioned and formed. Man lives everywhere under the ban of his ideas. And especially so the savage, who is endowed with a highly sensitive imagination and who lacks the correlative power of sober thought. The less familiar he is with the causal connection and relations of the grand elemental occurrences of his environment, the greater is his apprehension of the crushing power of the many enigmas that threaten him, and he will content himself with any hypothesis of explanation. Bastian has aptly pictured this ineffectual effort of the savage to place himself aright in the world, and likewise the intellectual reaction which follows: "The savage soon weakens and flags in the work of analytically disintegrating that which he sees before him, he accepts the existence of the Unknown as such, and with this signification assigned, he enters it into the catalogue of his ideas. He has thus voluntarily established within himself a principle of despotism which he must obey as slave and serf until his reason shall have succeeded in resolving it into its constituent elements and he shall have thus become able to control it. . . . . With the acceptance of the Unknown the savage has admitted an unmeasurable quantity into the succession of his ideas, an x of undetermined and indeterminable value, which in every intellectual problem, in every calculation of an intellectual series, will be the qualifying factor, and will control the process. The savage is without interruption helplessly subject to the tyrrany of this Unknown. He sees it on every hand. It peeps out from every object in nature. Physical objects he dare not touch. The plant that is necessary for nourishment and the preservation of his life, dare not be picked without ceremonies of atonement." The same is true of his entire environment. The well-known legal principle of *res nullius* has no meaning for the savage. All that is strange and unwonted inspires him with immediate fear. Only with his equals does he associate without constraint. A stranger, a diseased person, are to him objects of solemn dread.

This bent of reflection especially associates itself with the interruptions of normal existence; as with severe illness and death. For in these cases every explanatory analogy is lacking, and the dread horror of an unseen power of destruction seizes man. "The savage in the jungle fancies he sees a demon among the branches of the trees, fancies he sees the demon descending upon him, grasping his body with icy hand and violently shaking it in chill and fever. And on the other hand when we call it miasma, the difference is in reality not so great. . . . The notion of a demon, of a spirit, is for the man of nature too pertinent, too available and too comprehensible to be displaced by an unmeaning and jingling word. On the contrary he sees the demon in everything; he spiritualizes all nature; he refers all her processes to superhuman agents." Yet this dreadful demon, in other respects fashioned after the likeness of man, is but a mighty figure from the great Land of Spirits with which the savage peoples the world, and it will necessitate a more exact analysis to understand the full significance of such psychical creations.

Aside from Bastian, the establishment of the so-called theory of animism is particularly due to the labors of C. Tylor. (Compare his works "Primitive Culture," "Early History of Mankind," and "Anthropology.") "Animism," he says, "takes in several doctrines which so forcibly conduce to personification, that savages and barbarians apparently without any effort, can give consistent individual life to phenomena that our utmost stretch of fancy only avails to personify in conscious metaphor. An idea of pervading life and will in nature far outside modern limits, a belief in personal souls animating even what we call inanimate bodies, a theory of transmigration of souls as well in life as after death, a sense of crowds of spiritual beings sometimes flitting through the air but

sometimes also inhabiting trees, and rocks, and waterfalls, and so lending their own personality to such material objects—all these thoughts work in mythology with such manifold coincidences as to make it hard indeed to unravel their separate action."

Here belongs every conception of nature, whether it be in the delicate æsthetic perspective of Grecian art or in the gloomily misshapen and distorted forms of Fetichism. Animism, being thus uninterruptedly bound up with human existence, is accordingly the primitive basis of all religions. We, by reason of our one-sided mechanical methods of viewing things, are no longer able to comprehend it in all its phases. So that Spiritualism, the modern revival of this great psychical power, appears very strange to us. The greatest impulse to this organically operating creation of spirits springs from the phenomenon of death, which so violently startles the ordinary course of thought, and which the minds of rude men therefore mark as anomalous and unnatural and do not regard as the natural and necessary result of chemical and physical factors. "The great question that forces itself on their minds is one that we with all our knowledge cannot answer, what the life is that is sometimes in us, but not always. A person who a few minutes ago was walking and talking with all his senses active, goes off motionless and unconscious in a deep sleep, to wake after a while with renewed vigor. In other conditions the life ceases more entirely when one is stunned or fallen into a swoon or trance, where the beating of the heart and breathing seem to stop, and the body, lying deadly pale and insensible, cannot be awakened; this may last for minutes or hours, or even days, and yet after all the patient revives. Barbarians are apt to say that such a one died for a while, but his soul came back again. They have great difficulty in distinguishing real death from such trances. They will talk to a corpse, try to rouse it and even feed it, and only when it becomes noisome and must be got rid of from among the living, they are at last certain that life has gone never to return. What then is this soul or life which thus goes and comes in sleep, trance, and death?" *

With the addition of other motive factors, particularly dreams, the idea of the soul was naturally formed, which as an immaterial principle did not perish at the same time with the body, but would lead an independent existence, conceived, of course, in many different phases. For times so extremely realistic it is quite intelligible that this strange factor was not conceived in the abstract, but on the contrary incarnated in physical functions. Thus the soul appears at times as breath, vapour, shadow (as in the well-known scene in the Odyssey) and then—more physiologically—as blood. The idea, having once originated, is necessarily developed in accordance with natural laws to more comprehensive forms, and is continually absorbing more extended provinces of moral activity. On the one hand we find the care of the grave, the preservation of the body (embalming), and the worship of the liberated soul, so incomparably mightier after death (among the Egyptians); the All Souls' feasts, and feasts in honor of the dead, held in common with the Japanese and the Roman Catholics; or the fearful sacrifices which are offered to the soul of a mighty chieftain at his grave; the burning of widows by the Hindus, suppressed with difficulty only a few decades ago; and finally the loathsome forms of cannibalism based upon the reception of blood. On the other hand, homage to heroes in ever increasing gradation, until their worship becomes stamped upon a whole nation. And, as in Central Africa, the gods often prove to be incompetent in practical life to ward off approaching danger, so that they must be displaced in favor of new fetiches, so, at times, in the great struggle for spiritual dominion over civilized nations the ancient powers must grudgingly give way before a strange and conquering host of new divinities. Thus the Persians banished their one-time Aryan saints to the Kingdom of Ahriman, and the Germanic divinities that had planted themselves so deep in the hearts of our ancestors, lingered on after the influx of Christianity in the shape of ghostly cobolds and fiends. Passing by the well-known forms of metempsychosis in India and Egypt, the idea of the regeneration or incarnation of the highest God, so wonderfully potent in history, demands short notice. It has perhaps received its most marked development in the originally atheistic religion of Buddha, who appears to the faithful unto the end of time in the ever renascent person of Dalai Lama. This idea, which surpasses in boldness of conception, all similar ventures of western Catholicism, is adhered to with wonderful tenacity by that church—so tenaciously, in fact, that at this moment (1888) there is assembled at the central seat of Buddhistic faith, at the unapproachable and holy sanctuary of Lhassa in Thibet, the council of fathers, to espy some new heir of divine wisdom for the place left vacant by its late dignitary.

[TO BE CONCLUDED.]

* Tylor.

THE CORTEX AND ITS RELATIONS.

THE end-stations of the innumerable fibres of the corona radiata are the gray cells of the Cortex. These gray cells form the ganglionic element of the hemispheres. In the human brain they are associated among themselves by many systems of commissural fibres, which although extremely complex and numerous, are yet very economically arranged. Almost every prov-

ince of the brain stands in direct relation with other provinces.

The white fibres of the brain accordingly consist first of ascending, and secondly of descending nerves, all of which are gathered together in the capsules. A dissection of these bundles would therefore destroy the connections of the Cortex with all the lower centres of the nervous system. Through these narrow passages all sensory impressions rise into, and all voluntary motor impulses descend from, the hemispheric region. But besides the ascending and descending fibres, there is a third class which we call commissural fibres, serving the purpose of inter-communication among the cortical cells, and establishing relations also between the cortex and the hemispheric ganglions (*nucleus caudatus* and *nucleus lentiformis*).

There are commissural fibres which interconnect the two hemispheres. The most important tract of these nerves forms a thick and broad body of a tough structure, called *corpus callosum* (German *Balken*). A smaller tract of this kind is the anterior commissure. Fibres of the anterior commissure inter-connect both temporal lobes, while the corpus callosum appears to bring all other parts of the one hemisphere into relation with the corresponding parts of the other.



SAGITTAL MEDIAN SECTION.
(After Edinger.)

Showing the course of some tracts of the corona radiata. The strongest bundle in the middle is the pyramidal tract. The decussation of the pyramidal tract is visible below the medulla oblongata.

The rays of the tegmentum (*Haubenstrahlung*) rise from the tegmentum (*Haube*).

There are two connections with the Pons (*Brücke*).



COMMISSURAL FIBRES OF THE HEMISPHERES. (After Edinger.)

Diagram of the connections between the Striped Body and the Cortex.

(After Huguenin, reproduced from Charcot.)

NC. Nucleus caudatus.
CO. Thalamus opticus (French, *couche optique*).
NL. Nucleus lentiformis, having three segments.
AM. Claustrum (French, *avant mur*).
CI. Capsula interna.
CE. Capsula externa.
PP. Crus cerebri
CA. Cornu Ammonis.
NI. Insula.
FL. Fibres of crus in connection with nucleus lentiformis.
FN. Fibres of nucleus lentiformis in connection with cortex.
FK. Fibres of nucleus caudatus in connection with cortex.
FP. Direct fibres, establishing a direct connection between cortex and crus.
CC. Corpus callosum.

CORONAL SECTION THROUGH THE BRAIN,

Showing the connections between both Hemispheres by the corpus callosum and the commissura anterior. (After Edinger.)

FIBRÆ PROPRIÆ.
(After Edinger.)

Nerve fibres connecting adjacent circumvolutions.

The most important bundles that associate the different provinces of the same hemisphere are the *fasciculus arcuatus* (arching bundle), the *fasciculus unci-*



COMMISSURAL FIBRES OF THE HEMISPHERES. (After Edinger.)

natus (the hooked bundle), the *fasciculus longitudinalis inferior* (the lower longitudinal bundle) and the *cingulum* or girdle.

According to experiments made by Charcot, a dissection of two-thirds of the front part of the internal capsule produces paralysis, while a dissection of the posterior limb, the third and hindmost part of the capsula interna, is accompanied with anæsthesia. This proves that the anterior fibres of the capsule are mainly motor, and the posterior fibres sensory nerves.



STRONGLY MAGNIFIED SECTION OF CORTICAL SUBSTANCE.
(After Edinger.)
(Taken from the frontal lobe of a human brain.)

The most superficial layer of gray cells (*1*) is covered with a net-work of extremely fine white fibres (tangential fibres); the cells of the lower strata are the larger, the deeper they are situated. The second layer passes gradually into the third, containing large pyramidal cells. The fourth layer contains smaller cells.

These four layers are intersected by white fibres which, enumerating them from below, Edinger calls, *a*) radii or medullar rays; *b*) interradiary net-work; *c*) Grennary's layer (called after Grennary who described these fibres); *d*) superradiary net-work; and *e*) tangential fibres.

The right part is prepared with Weigert's Haemotoxyline, the left part with Golgi's sublimate, showing on the left side the fibres and on the right side the gray cells only. There are many more gray cells than appear in the diagram. Their number is reduced in order to show their relations more clearly. The gray cells appear somewhat larger than they ought to, because the sublimate employed, according to Golgi's method, not only colors the gray substance, but fills the hollow spaces round the cells and their processes also.

The Cortex, or gray substance of the hemispheres, is a very complex substance, which shows a great variety in the different parts of the brain. It consists of several layers of gray cells of different size embedded into white fibres. The adjoined diagram represents a strongly magnified section of the Cortex, taken from the frontal lobe, and prepared with two different chemicals. The left side makes the gray cells come out strongly, while the white fibres disappear. In the left side, on the contrary, the gray matter disappears, while the white fibres come out so as to be plainly visible. P. C.

THE COMMONWEALTH OF ICELAND.

BY ALBERT H. GUNLOGSEN.

I.

From their direct bearings upon the ancestral history of the Teutonic nations, the annals and social institutions of the old Icelandic Commonwealth, to impartial and enlightened students of history, assume an exceptional importance. In fact, the laws and institutions of that northern Commonwealth, strictly speaking, belong to the *race*, but less so, or not at all, to the middle-age of Europe. As a Germanic, racial study the subject, indeed, is teeming with ethnological and historical interest, and we are here confronted by an astonishing wealth of reliable and accessible sources of information. A certain class of anti-Teutonic and superficial writers of modern history have affected to frown upon the authority of the Icelandic *Sagas*, although as regards their general veracity, it has been correctly observed by a well-known English writer, that "much passes for history in other lands on far slighter grounds, and many a story in Thucydides or Tacitus, even in Clarendon and Hume, is believed on evidence not one-tenth part so trustworthy." For a general, popular knowledge of the social and intellectual life of Iceland in the days of her Commonwealth, I may refer the English-speaking reader to the article "Iceland" in the British Encyclopædia, and to Sir George Webbe Dasent's Introduction to his version of the "Nial's Saga" and to the great Cleasby-Vigfusson, Icelandic-English Dictionary; but for a thorough historical criticism of the institutions of the old Icelandic State, to the work of the German Professor, Konrad Maurer: *Island von seiner ersten Entdeckung bis zum Untergange des Freistaats* (Iceland from its first discovery until the collapse of the Commonwealth).

Iceland has been called "the home of the Eddas." It certainly preserved the Eddas; and Icelandic *Skalds* and writers also, to a considerable extent, arranged their mythological contents, and definitely fixed their poetical form, together with the undying, resonant language in which they still portray to us "the bright divinities of Asgard, that once protected men against the chaotic natural powers." On the other hand, the Eddas, are at present being subjected to a searching historical and literary criticism, concerning their absolute importance as the genuine sources of the primordial cosmogony and theogony of the Teutonic nations. This important question, however, does not detrimentally affect the political history of the Ice-

landic Commonwealth. The critics of the Eddas, at all times will find it sufficiently difficult to decide, to what extent, precisely, the Scandinavian *Asic* religion, independently of the Eddas, itself was a genuine and *common* Teutonic inheritance. In this brief essay it becomes an irrelevant matter, whether particular Eddic lays, as, for example, the lay of *Thrym*, be an Icelandic paraphrase of the classic legend of Prometheus; the lay of *Harbard*, of the feats of Hercules; that of Völund of the legend of Vulcan, and that of Fjölsvinnr, only a paraphrase of the "Amor and Psyche" of Apulejus. The odd hypothesis, surely, would suggest a rather exalted notion of the classical culture of the eleventh century Icelandic scholars, to whom such paraphrases have been attributed.

The broad fact remains, that the men, who in the ninth century colonized Iceland, were *heathen* Scandinavian Teutons; and that the very *ethical* elements, from which they built up their Commonwealth, were essentially from the outset heathen and Teutonic traditions, still untouched by the Christian culture of mediæval Europe. At that early date of settlement there also, doubtless, were found considerable Kelto-Norse ethnic ingredients, but, as shown by the institutions of the Commonwealth, they remained purely passive, without in the least affecting the exclusively Norse and Scandinavian social organization of old Iceland.

The *personal* history of these heathen Scandinavian settlers forms even an important and characteristic feature in the general history of geographical discovery and colonization, and particularly in that of the settlement of Iceland. Nearly all of these early navigators were wealthy men, belonging to the oldest and noblest clans of the North; and their peculiar methods of colonization must be said to have been perfectly consonant with their social condition, and previous habits. To better understand this, we only need to recall to mind the unique state of society which they had left behind.

The almost patriarchal condition of society in Scandinavia toward the close of the ninth century had been rapidly approaching its total disintegration, and at last both the Asic worship and the social institutions with which it had been intimately associated were swept away before a resistless historical tide that had set in from the south. The young Norwegian king, Harold Fairhair, after a struggle had successfully subdued one by one the many "fylkis"-kings, "Hersirs" and free "Uddallers" of the land, and made himself absolute monarch of all Norway. With the decisive battle of Hafrsfjord, against the last coalition of his stubborn foes, he had practically attained the object of his ambition. To the haughty, freeborn Norwegian chiefs Harold's innovation had been only unbearable tyranny, and a usurpation of their own time-honored proprietary rights. It really was a step in advance in the resistless march of civilization and progress.

But then, a hurried and mighty exodus of indignant, irreconcilable Norwegian chiefs set in. From every petty "fylkis"-kingdom and "Hérad" in the south, through the entire length of the land, they resolutely took to the sea. In their black, dragon-headed boats they steered westward toward the British Isles—the well-known course of their usual summer-expeditions. The Faroe-Isles in mid-ocean were settled; next the Scottish Isles—the Orkneys, Shetland, and the Western Isles. All these for a time became the rallying points and true home of the Vikings, whence still spitefully they defied the power of Harold, and directed their descents, not only upon Ireland and Scotland, but even upon the coasts of Norway.

At this period we also read about the first visits of the Northmen to the most isolated of all the islands of the North-Atlantic. It was visited by three successive Viking navigators, and the last, the Norwegian Flóki Vilgerdarson had given to the island the uninviting name of Iceland. It was, indeed, a strange region of surprising natural contrasts. It was situated about five hundred miles to the northwest of Scotland, and long before the advent of the Norsemen it had represented a kind of northern "Thebaïde" to a number of morose and lonely Irish Culdees. Its forty thousand square miles were the creation of submarine, volcanic agency; but its admirable geographical configuration presented a number of deep, narrow fjords, alternating with grand bays, like the Faxa and Breida-fjord. The interior consisted of vast tracts of lava-deserts and lofty ice-mountains. The narrow coast around the bays, and the banks of the fjords and the marshy districts were the habitable parts of the country; while from the bottoms of the fjords, a few miles inland, there extended fertile valleys with rich pastures, and sweet grasses. Despite the high latitude it was not a cold country; but there were frequent climatic fluctuations. The winters were never extremely severe, the summers were cool. The grass-crop might be injured by periodical drift-ice, causing heavy rains. The settlers found the country well-adapted for live-stock; and rivers, lakes, and the sea were teeming with fish. Such was the austere region, which, from a Thebaïde of Irish Culdees, became the safe refuge of the imperilled household-gods and traditions of the self-exiled Norse Chiefs of the ninth century.

In the year 874 Ingólf Arnarson figured as the first permanent Norse settler of Iceland. The colonists were called "Landnámsmenn," and the time of colonization extended from 874 to 930. During this

comparatively short space of time the Island received all its settlers, to the number, doubtless, of over fifty thousand souls. At that time of history and of navigation this represented an unparalleled feat of colonization, and vividly illustrates the extraordinary rush of immigrants from Norway and from the Scottish Isles. The turbulent chiefs, who had been defeated at Hafrsfjord, the obdurate old Vikings from Ireland and the Scottish Isles—all these "Zerschlagene Volkstrümmer," as they are called by Prof. Maurer, did not seem to furnish altogether desirable or favorable elements for the creation of an orderly commonwealth. But the splendid results entirely disproved this unfavorable assumption.

As men belonging to the oldest historical, or almost prehistorical, families of Scandinavia, they also, naturally, were thoroughly imbued with its racial culture, its mythology, poetry, laws, and traditions. We still know their names, almost to a man, as they have been recorded by the historian Ari Thorgilsson (1067–1148) in his "Landnámabók," or the Doomsday-book of Iceland.

This racial spirit is at once revealed in the formalities practiced at their taking possession of the land. The chief "hallowed the land," that is, he took possession with peculiar, solemn rites and sacrifices. He thereupon built a temple—the "Hof." As long as it was possible each appropriated broad lots of land, covering whole districts, which later he did not sell, but distributed among later comers or his freedmen. The chief, in his respective district, at once exercised the double functions of a civil magistrate and priest under the official name of "Godi." The word "Godi" apparently was of genuine Teutonic origin; Wulfila, in fact, renders the Greek ἱερεύς by the Gothic word "Gudja." Still, with the Northmen there existed no priestly caste, no division of society into priests and laymen. In this instance the Godi's political jurisdiction, called "Thing," was restricted to the temple, which he had erected at his own expense, and which was regarded as his *private* property; but church and state were both one. Thus, the Godi's influence, whether as magistrate or priest, was mainly a personal following. His authority could never degenerate into tyranny, for the thing-men of his district at all times were free to leave his temple and local "thing," and to join another temple, in another district. Many of these Icelandic Godar had already occupied the same position in Norway. In Norway also the temple-service had been an essential side of public life; the political activity of the people were also sacrificial feasts; but in Norway, at least in Prof. Maurer's opinion, the *tyrannis* of the Godar had been partly hereditary and partly elective. In Iceland the double functions of the Godar certainly gravitated toward the temple.

In this manner, during the first five decades of the settlement, there had spontaneously been formed a number of mutually independent temple-communes—"things"—like small kingdoms round the coasts of Iceland; but unavoidably there soon was felt the urgent need of a supreme executive power. Sixty years after the date of settlement, by the common consent of all the Godar presiding over all the local "things," Iceland became a Commonwealth. A man versed in the law, Ulfljót by name, was sent to Norway, and in 992 he brought back a code of law, based upon the code of the old Norwegian "gulathing." This urgent craving for laws was a characteristic trait, consonant with the directness of the Northman's nature. Ulfljót's code was adopted by the new Commonwealth, and henceforth the general Icelandic "Althing" or parliament annually met on the volcanic plain of Thingvalla. This Althing was both a deliberative and an executive assembly—a parliament and high-court of justice in one; but the state was an aristocracy and oligarchy. The high-court of the Althing numbered only one hundred and forty-four persons—forty-eight Godar and ninety six other law-men, named by the Godar themselves. We must bear in mind, that as yet there were no written laws, and that everything was handed down by a faithful and marvelously tenacious memory and tradition. The laws also were mainly committed to memory. There were law-men,—men invested with no official position, but who enjoyed influence through their knowledge of the law.

In order to counteract the power of the one hundred and forty-four members of the Court of law, the assembled Althing appoints the first highest officer of the law, the so-called "speaker of the law." His duty was to recite publicly the whole law, and to give his legal opinion to all. The Speaker formally became the president of the Althing, but to curtail his power the people jealously excluded him from all share in the executive. With the year 930 this constitution of the Icelandic Commonwealth had been completed; the country further was divided into quarters, containing "things" and "goðords," and each quarter was divided into three judicial districts. This, moreover, is the renowned "Saga-time" of Iceland, covering a period of one hundred years, until the year 1030, during which the events of the Sagas were enacted, whether relating to individual families at home, or to the achievements of Icelandic men in foreign lands; but, of course, I am here prevented from entering upon the vast and complicated subject of the internal history of the Commonwealth. During the Landnáma- and Saga-period there still prevailed a "leonine" state of society, moving, "on a splinter of adamant." The domestic establishments of the chiefs, and of all free born men, were crowded with their retainers and serving people,

and they all "worked hard." The education of the boys was chiefly directed to the development of their muscles, the use of arms, running, riding, swimming, wrestling; others worked in wood and metals. They learned mythology, poetry, law, and traditional history, making verses and playing at draughts. The girls were fitted to become house-wives, doctors, surgeons. They carded wool, spun, wove it into cloth, and dyed it. The early Saga-time, without doubt, can boast a date, not merely of local Icelandic interest, but which conspicuously connects it with the world's foremost nautical and geographical events. In the year 982 an Icelandic farmer, a turbulent and "hard" citizen of the Commonwealth, Erik Thorvaldsson, affectionally surnamed "the red," banished from Iceland for repeated violent deeds, sailed westward, discovered and colonized Greenland. Setting out from his last Icelandic home at Oexney in the Broadfirth, he had merely followed the directions suggested by other Icelandic navigators. In the year 1000 his son Leif "the lucky" discovered the American continent. The documents relating to these events, particularly by modern American writers, have frequently been subjected to unfair and ignorant criticism. To obtain a comprehensive survey of the literature, bearing upon the subject, the critics must not content themselves with the well-known collection *Antiquitates Americanæ*, but should include a voluminous and instructive work, written mostly in Danish by the renowned Icelandic philologist and antiquarian, Professor Finnr Magnússon, entitled: "The historical monuments of Greenland"—"Grönlands historiske Mindesmœrker." The critics, further, must not forget, that the Icelandic authors of an important and graphic portion of the American Sagas—the Thorfinn's Saga—are to be regarded as well-informed and highly trustworthy authorities upon the subject.

[TO BE CONCLUDED.]

THE RETURN OF THE NEGROES TO AFRICA.

BY PROF. E. D. COPE.

CRITICISM on my paper on this subject in *The Open Court* of January 23d, 1890, having apparently ceased, I am disposed to recur to the subject for two reasons. One of these is that I wish to reply to my critics; and the other is that Mr. Henry M. Stanley is said to have taken up the subject, and to be prepared to place his knowledge of Central Africa at the disposal of the proper authorities when the project shall have been decided on.

I am not surprised to find that the objectors to the project of transferring the negroes from this country to Africa have nothing but sentimental objections to urge against it. They call their objections ethical, and imagine that they have the support of justice in their position. Their understanding of the import of ethics and justice may differ from mine, but I suspect that their view chiefly results from an ignorance of some fundamental principles of biology, and their failure to perceive the bearings of these on the problem.

In order to present a rational objection to the plan of separating the Ethiopian from the Indo-European race by 3000 miles of water, its opponents should prove, first, that the negro and white races will not hybridize in the countries where they live together; or second, that the hybrid, if produced, possesses mental characteristics as good as those of the whites. Neither of my critics has done this, and until they do so, their objections are absolutely worthless. On the contrary, if the opposite of my position be proven, I will promptly abandon it. As to the question of injustice, we have to decide, if injustice there be, as to who shall be the sufferer. Shall we subject the higher race to deterioration; or shall we subject the lower to transportation without material loss to it. To do the former is to injure the entire human species. To do the latter is to continue the process which the abolition of slavery inaugurated, to teach the negro to stand on his own legs, a process which can be no more called injustice than the exercise of the methods of education, which the world has for us all from childhood.

The hardships of the transportation would be trifling, and not greater than those which thousands of immigrants to this country voluntarily undergo. I have lived in various parts of the world, and I could be happy in any of them, provided my family and friends were not too far removed. Now it is not proposed to separate families and friends in this exodus, so that the picture of sufferings from this cause, drawn by one of my critics, is quite imaginary. As to the country, Stanley states that parts of the Upper Congo region are admirable as places of residence, and free from the swamps of many of our southern states.

Abstract objections on the one side weigh little against facts on the other. Objections against compulsory education and against compulsory vaccination are of the same character, and are generally admitted to be valueless as against the important benefits accruing to mankind from the enforcement of these provisions.

I repeat again what appear to me to be the facts of the case. The characteristics of the negro-mind are of such a nature as to unfit him for citizenship in this country. He is thoroughly superstitious, and absolutely under the control of supernaturalism, in some generally degrading form, and the teachers of it. He is lacking in rationality and in morality. Without going further, these traits alone should exclude him from citizenship. Secondly, these peculiarities depend on an organic constitution which it will require ages to remove. Corresponding qualities in the lower strata of the white race, are modified or removed in a comparatively short time, on account of superior natural mental endowment. Thirdly, if he remains in this country he will mix with the whites until in a half century or less, there will not be a person of pure negro blood in it. It follows from this that there will be, in accordance with the usual rate of increase, an immense population of mulattoes, where there should be an equal number of whites. The deterioration thus resulting would tell disastrously on our intellectual and moral, and consequently on our political, prosperity.

In view of these facts, it appears to me that the surplus in the treasury could not be better spent, and the navy of the country be better employed, than in the transportation of these people to Africa, where they can work out their own destiny, whatever that may be. The necessity seems to me to be great and urgent, and nothing but an ignorance of the facts of the case can prevent its being felt to be such by every white citizen of this republic.

It is not denied by me that the negro has various merits, and that in particular instances men of that race have risen to deserved prominence. But the general result is not altered by these exceptions. Senator Morgan's bill, or something like it, should be passed promptly, and its provisions carried into effect before the burden becomes greater, and the material conditions beyond our control.

CORRESPONDENCE.

FREE-WILL AND COMPULSION.

To the Editor of The Open Court :—

In reply to a rationalistic criticism on the "Freedom of Will and Responsibility" the Editor of *The Open Court* makes the following curious statement: "And a free man must of necessity will and act as he does." It follows therefore that every one who is *compelled* to will and act as he does must be free.

According to the usual value of words the statement is contradictory, but without stumbling over the form of expression, I cannot see how a self-conscious person can accept the logic or the philosophy of such Freedom of the Will *and* responsibility. We do not hold accountable the stream for obedience to the law of necessity in its running or its babbling, nor can we hold a human being responsible for his action who has no freedom of will to do as he *wills*, only subject to the broad limitations of his material existence. Without such a freedom there can be no unrealized possibilities in life, no "might have been," no accountability either to his own organism or the "All," and no "promise or potency" of future improvement.

From this standpoint moral responsibility is a mere vagary of undeveloped organism—there can be no infraction of law in life or action, for the individual as a part of the whole *has* to conform to the cosmical laws of the All and whatever he does, right or wrong morally, as usually understood is in obedience to the rigid law of cause and effect over which he can have no control whatever. This philosophy logically extinguishes purpose, intelligent direction of energy, and Freedom of Will, and necessarily regret or remorse, and relegates human thought and action to the domain of mechanical energy. A philosophy that leads to such a conclusion, it seems to me, would be a dangerous substitute for Religion, until in the eternal sequences humanity becomes developed into a far higher and nobler state of existence. T. G. Conant.

[Epictetus said: "No one can deprive us of our free-will;" and Schiller said: "Man is free e'en were he born in chains." All ethical teachers agree that a man can be held responsible for his actions only if he is free, or, in other words, only if he can *act* as he *wills*.

If there is any sense in the phrase, Freedom of Will, it means this and nothing else. A free man can act according to his will; he acts exactly as he wills. A slave cannot act as he wills. When a slave works for his master he acts under compulsion. When a free man works, say for instance an artist whose soul is full of an idea, he acts of his own freewill, for there is no one who compels him to work. The slave suffers violence, the free man's will suffers no violence. The slave's work does not result from his will; therefore he is not free. The artist's work does result from his will; therefore he is free. Yet the actions of both are determined and so are their wills determined. The slave is not willing to work, he is forced to work against his will by fear. The artist is willing to work, and his will is motived by the love of his art.

If the phrase Freedom of Will is used in the sense that a man can *will* whatever he *wills* it is no freedom of will but simply a contradiction, a phrase without rhyme or reason. The mere idea that a man can will one thing and, being the very same man under the very same conditions, he could will another thing is an absurdity. A man might *wish* two different things that exclude one another. But he can will only one.

If will were not determined, it would be the abolition of the law of causality with regard to will. This would change all acts of will into arbitrary whims.

A cause that determines a rational being to will something is called a motive; and no man can have any will unless he has a sufficient motive that determines his will. Insufficient motives cause wishes. A will without motive is as nonsensical as an effect without a cause. A man whose actions are not determined by motives cannot be made responsible for his actions and ought to be confined in an asylum.

Responsibility is the consciousness of a free man that he is the author of his actions and of their consequences. He himself, and also others have to bear the consequences of his actions, be it for good or for evil. A man who knows the laws of nature and especially also the moral law that pervades and builds society, and who has at the same time the good will to conform to it, he is a law unto himself. He will act morally, not from compulsion, but from free will.

A philosophy or a religion that does not recognize the rigidity of law has no right to teach ethics. What would be the use of implanting the motives of obeying the moral ought in the soul of man, if his will were not determined by any motives.—Ed.]

MODERATE NATIONALISM.

To the Editor of The Open Court :—

I have been greatly interested by the correspondence in your issue of the 8th inst. on the subject of competition. If you will permit, I shall offer a few practical remarks. The author of "Looking Forward" says: "Let us not be frightened by wolfish competition. It is better and nobler than it appears . . . ."

To this I would add, Let us be definite. It is safe to say that the cardinal principle of the current economy is *laissez faire*. From John Stuart Mill, to more recent writers, nothing is more strongly insisted on than the necessity of understanding the term capital. Nothing is more confused than the definition of the term. Men discuss about when a thing is capital and when it is not, and eagerly pursue a grain of wheat in its voyage around the world, and cry, now it is capital, now it is not. Let us endeavor to follow the suggestion of "the author" and "agree with facts." In point of fact the distinction between capital and not-capital cannot be relegated to the mind of the owner, Mill notwithstanding. In point of fact capital is *the surplus of assets over liabilities*. The various distinctions of "Paid up Capital," "Reserve," "Dividend Guarantee," and other funds, "Profits," are no more than divisions of the total capital, for book-keeping purposes. A man may bury it, burn it, or buy with it, but capital is what it is, no matter what he does or may intend to do with it.

But the notion that capital is only that which is owned by employers of labor has had serious effects. It naturally produced the principle of *laissez faire*. For if the agent of production should not be interfered with; and capital, one agent of production, is only that which is owned by employers of labor; then it follows that capital should not be interfered with, hence *laissez faire*. But if in point of fact capital be the surplus of assets over liabilities, and national capital the sum of individual capital, it becomes economical folly not to use the factor to the utmost extent which business-like prudence may allow. Hence what is called moderate nationalism, and the principle of protection, which is directly opposed to *laissez faire*.

I agree with the author in his objection to the prevailing "tendency to dream." I would myself also object to the prevailing tendency on his side to evade *definite* measures of reform. He says, "it is not the abolition of strife that we can hope for, it is only its humanization." Quite so. But by means of the investment of national capital by national vote, in railroads, telegraphs, telephones, mines, and commercial marine, and a truly national bank managed by government, and private banks abolished, national stock exchanges and markets, national currency, in a word moderate nationalism at once definite and practical.

Michael Corcoran.

Custer, South Dakota, May 16, 1890.